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CASE NOTE
PERRY V. LEEKE- THE PERMISSION OF TRIAL COURTS TO ORDER
SILENT RECESSES
THIS CONTROVERSY AROSE out of alleged Sixth Amend-
ment rights violations, which occurred during the trial of Don-
ald Ray Perry, who had been accused of participating in a kidnap-
ping and sexual assault that ended in a brutal murder. As part of
Perry's defense, his counsel sought to establish that Perry was
mildly retarded and that any wrongdoing on his part was solely
attributable to the duress inflicted upon him by his cohorts.' The
defense called a psychologist and a psychiatrist to testify as to
Perry's mental capabilities. The experts stated that Perry had a
"childlike personality," a difficulty distinguishing reality from fan-
tasy and an "inability to cope with stressful situations."2
Despite his mental infirmities, the defendant took the stand to
testify in his defense. Upon completion of the defendant's direct
testimony, the court declared a fifteen-minute recess and ordered
the defendant not to confer with anyone, including his attorney.'
Perry's counsel objected, stating that he merely wanted to confer
with his client so that he could inform Perry of his rights during
cross-examination.4 This request was denied and the emotionally
disturbed defendant was taken to a very small room, with no win-
dows. His attorney was not even given an opportunity to explain
why Perry could not confer with him during the recess.5 Interest-
ingly, during the state's presentation of its case-in-chief, the trial
court ordered several recesses, some of which were ordered while
witnesses were testifying. However, unlike the defendant, the
1. Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594, 596 (1989)
2. Id. at 606 n.6.
3. Id. at 594.
4. Id. at 606 n.6.
5. Id.
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state's witnesses were not barred from engaging the prosecutor in
conversation. 6
Following the resumption of trial, counsel for the defendant
moved for a mistrial. In denying the motion, the trial court stated
that the defendant was not entitled to seek legal advice concerning
his impending cross-examination.7
This matter was eventually appealed to the South Carolina
Supreme Court where Perry's conviction was affirmed.8 In arriv-
ing at its decision, the court held that the trial court's order did
not deprive the defendant of his Sixth Amendment rights because
"[n]ormally, counsel is not permitted to confer with his defendant
client between direct and cross-examination." 9
Undaunted, the defendant then sought a writ of habeas
corpus in federal court. The District Court held that defendants
do indeed have a right to counsel during short recesses, denial of
which constitutes grounds for reversal, regardless of whether the
defendant is able to establish prejudice resulting therefrom.'"
Based upon this reasoning, the District Court granted the defend-
ant's petition for a a writ of habeas corpus."
Much to the defendant's dismay, however, that decision was
reversed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals sitting in banc."
Although the court agreed that the trial court's ruling deprived
Perry of a constitutionally protected right, it held that such depri-
vations must be subjected to a prejudice-harmless error analysis
before they can be considered grounds for reversal.' 3 Based upon
its review of the record, the court held that since the evidence
indicating Perry's guilt was very strong, the denial of access to
counsel merely constituted harmless error, and therefore his con-
viction should not be disturbed.'4 Similar to the District Court,
the dissent argued that such deprivations warranted automatic
dismissal and that a prejudice inquiry was impractical because it
would require a probe into past and predicted future client
6. Id. at 609 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 596.
8. State v. Perry, 278 S.C. 490, 299 S.E.2d 324 (1983)
9. Id. at 493, 299 S.E.2d at 325-326.
10. Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594, 597 (1989).
11. Id.
12. Perry v. Leeke, 832 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1987) (in banc).
13. Id. at 839-40.




The disagreement between the majority and the dissent was
indicative of the debate which arose among federal appellate
courts as to whether denying access to counsel during a brief re-
cess constitutes an automatic ground for reversal or whether such
violations must first be subjected to a prejudice-harmless error
analysis.' 6 Although the federal appellate courts disagreed as to
the effect of such violations, most agreed that the denial of coun-
sel during a brief court ordered recess constituted a constitutional
violation. The Supreme Court of the United States recognized the
importance of these issues and the frequency with which they
arose, and sought to resolve them in Perry?
I. HISTORY
The issue in Perry involves a defendant's right to counsel
which is guaranteed by the sixth amendment.' 8 Traditionally, the
right to counsel has been broadly construed to protect defendants
at every stage of their defense. In Powell v. Alabama, 9 the Su-
preme Court stated:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel . . . . [A
defendant] is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence . . . . He
lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his de-
fense, even though he [may] have a perfect one. He requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step of the proceedings against
him.2"
One justification for a broad application of the right to counsel is
that when an individual is confronted with the awesome power of
the state he or she needs an attorney to help balance the inequities
between the parties. By helping to achieve a more equitable bal-
ance between the parties, the truth-seeking function of the trial
process is more likely to be effectuated. 2'
The parameters of the right to counsel had previously been
15. Id. at 848-49 (Winter, C.J., dissenting) (Judge Winter gives a number of exam-
ples showing the impracticality of determining what could be discussed in a fifteen minute
recess).
16. Perry, 109 S. Ct. at 598 n.2.
17. Id. at 598-99.
18. U.S. Const., amend. VI.
19. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
20. Id. at 68-69.
21. Perry, 109 S. Ct. at 605 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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construed by the federal appellate courts to encompass the right to
counsel during brief court ordered recesses. 2 The Supreme Court
went further in Geders v. United States" when the Court consid-
ered whether a defendant was entitled to consult with his client
during an overnight recess called while the defendant was testify-
ing. 4 Although an overnight recess would obviously give defense
counsel ample opportunity to discuss the remainder of the defend-
ant's forthcoming testimony, the Court unanimously held that the
trial court's order preventing the defendant from conferring with
his attorney during the overnight recess constituted a violation of
the defendant's sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel.2 5
In light of the Supreme Court's holding in Geders, every fed-
eral appellate court and nearly all of the state courts considering
the issue had agreed that any order barring communication be-
tween a defendant and his attorney during a recess constituted a
Sixth Amendment violation, regardless of the duration of the re-
cess.26 The only controversy surrounding this area of the law was
whether such a violation was an automatic ground for reversal or
whether the error must be subjected to a prejudice-harmless error
analysis .2 7 The Perry case presented the Supreme Court with an
opportunity to resolve this peripheral issue as to what effect such
errors should have on appeal.
II. THE SUPREME COURT DEcIsION
A. The Opinion of the Court
Surprisingly, the Court began by restructuring the primary
focus of the case. In rejecting the rationale of the Court of Ap-
peals, the Court made a distinction between inquiries measuring
the quality of a lawyer's work and inquiries involving a govern-
mental interference with the right to counsel.2 The Court held
that an inquiry into actual or constructive denial of legal assis-
tance "is not subject to the kind of prejudice analysis that is ap-
22. See Stubbs v. Brodenkircher, 689 F.2d 1205, 1206-07 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 461 U.S. 907 (1983); U.S. v. Allen, 542 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 908 (1977).
23. 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
24. Id. at 81.
25. Id. at 91.
26. Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594, 602-03 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 603 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 599-600.
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propriate in determining whether the quality of a lawyer's per-
formance itself has been constitutionally effective."2 9
Having resolved what was previously considered the central
dispute, the Court went on to consider the constitutionality of a
defendant's entitlement to converse with counsel during a brief
break in his or her testimony.30 Although most federal appellate
courts had previously concluded that defendants were entitled to
advice of counsel during brief recesses, the Court held to the con-
trary, stating that "the Federal Constitution does not compel
every trial judge to allow the defendant to consult with his lawyer
while his testimony is in progress if the judge decides that there is
good reason to interrupt the trial for a few minutes."31
Through its holding, the Court primarily sought to preserve
the truth-seeking function of the trial process. 32 When the defend-
ant becomes a witness, the Court asserted that the defendant no
longer has a "constitutional right to consult with his lawyer while
he is testifying" and that neither "he nor his counsel has a right to
have the testimony interrupted in order to give him the benefit of
counsel's advice." 3 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens con-
cluded that since these rules apply to all other witnesses, they
should also apply to defendants that choose to testify. 4 Justice
Stevens further justified the Court's holding by asserting that trial
court judges instruct witnesses not to discuss their testimony with
third parties as a matter of common practice.3 5
Underlying the Court's rationale was its assumption that dur-
ing a brief recess the defendant's testimony would more than
likely be the sole subject of any attorney-client conversation. 6 The
Court determined that permitting a defendant to discuss his testi-
mony with his attorney prior to cross-examination would obstruct
the truth-seeking function of the trial process.3 7 The Court ex-
plained that:
Cross-examination often depends for its effectiveness on the abil-
ity of counsel to punch holes in a witness' testimony at just the
29. Id. at 600.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 602.
32. Id. at 601.
33. Id. at 600.
34. Id. at 600-01.
35. Id. at 600.
36. Id. at 601.
37. Id.
1989-901
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right time, in just the right way. Permitting a witness, including
a criminal defendant, to consult with counsel after direct exami-
nation but before cross-examination, grants the witness an op-
portunity to regroup and regain a poise and sense of strategy
that the unaided witness would not possess. This is true even if
we assume no deceit on the part of the witness; it is simply an
empirical predicate of our system of adversary rather than in-
quisitorial justice that cross-examination of a witness who is un-
counseled between direct examination and cross-examination is
more likely to lead to the discovery of truth than is cross-exami-
nation of a witness who is given time to pause and consult with
his attorney. 8
Despite the Court's deep-rooted fear of attorney influence, the
Court maintained that its decision was not based upon the as-
sumption that an attorney would engage in unethical witness
"coaching" during a mid-testimony recess."
Although the Court's holding appeared to be a radical depar-
ture from Geders, it managed to preserve the Geders holding by a
narrow distinction.40 The Court distinguished the mid-testimony
overnight recess at issue in Geders in that the normal attorney-
client consultation which would occur during an overnight recess
"would encompass matters that go beyond the content of the de-
fendant's own testimony - matters that the defendant does have
a constitutional right to discuss with his lawyer, such as the avail-
ability of other witnesses, trial tactics, or even the possibility of
negotiating a plea bargain.1"41 Thus, unlike during a "short re-
cess," a defendant has an unrestricted right of access to his attor-
ney during a "long" recess, even though the defendant may dis-
cuss matters concerning his or her ongoing testimony."2 This
distinction was therefore based upon the Court's conclusion that it
was "appropriate to presume that nothing but testimony" would
be discussed during a short recess.43 As the Court admitted, how-
ever, the distinction is a "thin one." 44
38. Id.
39. Id. at 600.




44. Id. at 600.
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B. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Marshall, who was joined by Justices Brennan and
Blackmun, wrote an impressive and persuasive opinion which vi-
ciously attacked the majority's position." Essentially, the dissent-
ers concluded that the majority's distinction between short and
long recesses was without a constitutional or logical basis.46 As an
alternative, the dissent proposed that the Sixth Amendment
should be construed to forbid "any order barring communication
between a defendant and his attorney, at least where that commu-
nication would not interfere with the orderly and expeditious pro-
gress of the trial."'4 7
Justice Marshall began his attack by pointing out that the
majority's holding was contrary to the law's previously established
view of the Sixth Amendment.48 Justice Marshall reminded the
majority that the Sixth Amendment rights had been previously
guaranteed at every stage of the trial, especially when evidence of
the defendant's guilt is being elicited.49 The dissent was also
highly critical of the majority's assertion that "allowing a defend-
ant to speak with his attorney during a 'short' recess between di-
rect and cross-examination invariably will retard the truth-seeking
function of the trial" process.5 Justice Marshall pointed out that
the majority failed to provide evidence to support this assertion
and that the effects upon the truth-seeking process were never
considered in Geders.51 Furthermore, the dissent argued that ad-
vice of counsel can only enhance the truth-seeking function of ad-
judication. Justice Marshall based this claim upon the well-ac-
cepted notion that truth and fairness will be best served if there is
equal representation for both parties.52
The dissent also questioned the Court's assumption that the
conversations in question would be limited to a discussion of the
defendant's ongoing testimony. 53 During a brief mid-testimony re-
cess, the dissent stated that counsel could also "remind [the] de-
45. Id. at 602-09 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
46. Id (Marshall, J., dissenting).
47. Id (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 92
(1976)).
48. Id. at 602-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 603 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 605 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
51. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 605 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 607 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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fendant that certain cross-examination questions might implicate
his right against self-incrimination or relate to previously excluded
evidence. . . ."5 Similarly, counsel could use such an opportunity
simply to remind the defendant to mind his demeanor and "to
brace the defendant for the 'legal engine' steaming his way."55
Finally, the dissent argued that the majority's opinion will
create a tremendous amount of confusion amongst the lower
courts.5 6 When confronted with similar access-to-counsel cases,
the lower courts will now be forced to draw narrow lines of dis-
tinction between the majority's opinion and Geders based merely
upon the duration of the recess. In that regard, courts will have to
guess as to whether a court ordered recess is long enough to be
considered a long recess under Geders or whether it is a short re-
cess as described in the majority's opinion. Courts will also have
to consider whether the holding is limited to post-direct testimony
recesses or whether it encompasses all brief recesses called during
a defendant's testimony. Thus, the dissent argued that the major-
ity opinion raised more questions that it answered.5
III. ANALYSIS
In Perry v. Leeke the Supreme Court was presented with an
opportunity to resolve an appellate court conflict concerning the
proper effect of court orders which bar conversation between de-
fendants and their attorneys during court ordered recesses. Al-
though the Court concluded that a prejudice-harmless-error in-
quiry is not appropriate, it went further and held that a right to
counsel may be suspended during brief mid-testimony recesses.59
Simply stated, the justifications supporting the majority's po-
sition are weak and unpersuasive. Perhaps the most noticeable
flaw is that the Court's holding is completely based upon the as-
sumption that the defendant's testimony will be the only subject
of mid-testimony recesses.60 Considering the wide range of topics
which may be discussed during a brief recess, the majority's pri-
mary assumption is easily undermined.6" Nonetheless, the Court
54. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
55. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
56. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 608 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
58. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
60. Perry, 109 S. Ct. at 601.
61. Id. at 607 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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determined that trial court judges should be vested with the au-
thority to order silent mid-testimony recesses in order to maximize
the effect of cross-examination.62 However, as the dissent pointed
out, the loss of a constitutional right is too great a price to pay for
the sake of preserving cross-examination. 3 Furthermore, such
conversations may actually enhance the truth-seeking process by
helping to add balance to the trial proceedings.64
The majority opinion seems most inappropriate when viewed
in light of the particular facts of this case. The defendant was
mildly retarded and considered unable to handle stressful situa-
tions.6 5 Of course, one could argue that these mental infirmities
rendered the defendant more susceptible to persuasion and there-
fore rendered the truth in greater need of protection. However, a
brief consultation with his attorney would have allowed the de-
fendant to calm down and perhaps more accurately relate the
facts of the case.
Another distasteful aspect of the majority's opinion is that it
manifests a general distrust of attorneys. Although the majority
expressly denied that its holding was based upon such ill will, the
Court's firm belief that interaction with an attorney during a fif-
teen-minute break would jeopardize the truth-seeking function of
the trial process indicates that attorney distrust played a signifi-
cant part in the Court's decision.66 If the Court believed that at-
torneys could be trusted to uphold their ethical duties perhaps it
would have upheld the prior extensions of the right to counsel dur-
ing brief mid-testimony recesses.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the majority opinion
will produce confusion and inconsistency among the lower courts.
As the dissent pointed out, lower courts will have to draw very fine
lines based upon slight variations in the duration of the recesses.6 7
Through subsequent adjudication, the courts will have to decide
the extent to which the Perry holding applies, what constitutes a
short recess, what constitutes a long recess and whether an attor-
ney's promise not to discuss testimony is grounds for permitting a
limited conversation.6" Thus, by creating issues, the majority's
62. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
63. Perry, 109 S. Ct. at 608-09 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64. See supra text accompanying notes 31-38.
65. Perry, 109 S. Ct. at 606 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
66. See id. at 601.
67. Id. at 608 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68. Id (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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opinion has created more problems than it solves. Hopefully, when
one of the newly created issues reaches the Supreme Court, it will
reconsider the holding in Perry and perhaps overrule it entirely.
As a substitute, the Court should adopt the all-inclusive rule pro-
posed by the dissent.6 9 By forbidding any order barring communi-
cation between a defendant and his or her attorney, the Court
could resolve the inconsistencies it has created and better effectu-
ate the spirit of the Sixth Amendment.
RICHARD A. Di Lisi
69. Id. at 602 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Sixth Amendment forbids 'any or-
der barring communication between a defendant and his attorney, at least when that com-
munication would not interfere with the orderly and expeditious progress of the trial.' ")
(quoting Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 92 (1976)).
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